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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interaction between price and inventory decisions in an
oligopoly industry and its implications for the dynamics of prices. The work extends
existing literature and especially the work of Hall and Rust (2007) to endogenous
prices and strategic oligopoly competition. We show that the optimal decision rule
is an (S,s) order policy and prices and inventory are strategic substitutes. Fixed
ordering costs generate infrequent orders. Consequently, with strategic competition
in prices, (S,s) inventory behavior together with demand uncertainty generates en-
dogenous cyclical patterns in prices without any exogenous shocks. Hence, the devel-
oped model provides a promising framework for explaining dynamics of commodity
markets and especially observed autocorrelation in price ﬂuctuations.
Keywords: Inventory dynamics, price competition, oligopoly, (S,s) order pol-
icy, commodity markets.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D21, D43, E22, L81.
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the interaction between price and inventory decisions in an oligopoly
industry and its implications for the dynamics of prices such as price dispersion. Cross-
sectional price dispersion is a common feature in many retail markets. Since Stigler’s
(1961) seminal work price dispersion has usually been explained by consumer search
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tivated this work, for insightful guidance and invaluable advice. I also thank seminar participants at the
7th BGPE research workshop for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1costs. In contrast, Aguirregabiria (1999) shows that retail inventories can generate (S,s)
dynamics of inventories which in turn can explain time variability of prices of super-
market chains.1 However, as in his model monopolistic competition is analyzed price
dispersion between diﬀerent ﬁrms can not be observed.
Extending the described work, this paper addresses the question how oligopolistic
competition aﬀects these dynamics.2
Previous papers have characterized the optimal decision rules of similar dynamic
models. In addition to Aguirregabiria (1999) who analyzes price and inventories with
lump-sum costs under monopolistic competition Hall and Rust (2007) study optimal
inventory decisions with lump-sum costs under perfect competition. Their paper extends
the framework of Aguirregabiria (1999) in some ways but is otherwise limited to one
decision variable as prices are taken as given. Hall and Rust (2007) show that in their
perfect competition model the (S,s) policy is an optimal order strategy.3 To the best
of our knowledge, these two works studying extreme cases of competition are by far the
most elaborated papers investigating these decision problems.4 The analysis of optimal
decision rules under oligopolistic competition forms an obvious gap in the literature.
However, related studies of oligopolistic competition exists. Dutta and Sundaram
(1992) and Dutta and Rustichini (1995) analyze a discrete choice stochastic duopoly
game with lump-sum costs. In these frameworks the one abstract decision variable af-
fecting both ﬁrms’ payoﬀs cannot be interpreted as being related to inventory. Never-
theless, the optimality of an (S,s) policy can also be shown. More recently, Besanko and
Doraszelski (2004) study decisions about prices and capacity. However, the main and
important diﬀerence between inventory and capacity is that excess capacity is worthless
while keeping inventory aﬀects future competition. Hence, additional strategic eﬀects due
to kept stock are at place. This is especially important when investigating oligopolistic
competition.
This paper extends the literature by characterizing an equilibrium in a model of
price and inventory competition in oligopoly. We allow oligopolistic ﬁrms to interact
strategically. This allows for studying price dispersion between ﬁrms.
1Under an (S,s) rule inventory moves between the target inventory level, S, and the order threshold,
s, with s < S. Whenever the ﬁrm’s inventory level falls below the order threshold, a new order is placed
such that the target inventory level S is attained.
2Additionally, the main focus of the paper by Aguirregabiria is an empirical analysis building on a
numeric simulation. The formal theoretical proof of the optimality of the considered inventory decision
is therefore not rigourously done and incomplete. Thus, our paper is the ﬁrst to formally prove the
optimality of (S,s) policy with endogenous prices.
3Thereby Hall and Rust (2007) extend earlier work like Sethi and Cheng (1997) and Cheng and Sethi
(1999) to a more general speciﬁcation of the Markov process.
4There exist also some papers analyzing dynamic oligopoly with inventories without considering lump-
sum ordering cost, like Kirman and Sobel (1974) or more recently Bernstein and Federgruen (2004).
However, without ordering cost stationary optimal strategies result which are in essence identical to
those of the corresponding static single period game.
2Besides, such a model that is incorporating inventory and oligopoly in dynamic com-
petition provides the most plausible framework for retail industries. Retail industries
have become highly concentrated, i.e., in most categories like grocery, supermarkets,
and oﬃce supplies just a handful of rivals compete locally. In the supermarket industry
for example a small number of ﬁrms capture the majority of sales as supermarkets com-
pete in tight regional oligopolies. Thus, this industry is a prime example of oligopoly.
Besides, inventory costs are of major importance. Supermarkets invest in state of the art
distribution systems to minimize storage and transportation costs (see e.g. Beresteanu &
Ellickson, 2006; Ellickson, 2007). Hence, deciding the optimal inventory and store oﬀer
forms an important optimization problem for supermarket chains.
In this work we study the decision problem of a central store, i.e., its decision about
retail prices and orders to suppliers, facing oligopolistic competition and taking into
account the existence of lump-sum ordering cost. We develop a model of retail competi-
tion in which the impact of inventories on competition and prices can be evaluated. We
analyze the characteristics of the optimal decision rule.
The main ﬁndings of our theoretical model of oligopoly support the simulation results
of Aguirregabiria (1999) studying monopoly. Key factors for price ﬂuctuations are lump-
sum ordering costs and demand uncertainty. Lump-sum ordering cost generate (S,s)
inventory behavior. Demand uncertainty creates a positive probability of excess demand,
i.e., stockouts. The positive stockout probability has a negative eﬀect on expected sales
which in turn creates substitutability between prices and inventories in the proﬁt function
such that in equilibrium prices depend negatively and very signiﬁcantly on the level of
inventories. This results in a cyclical pattern of inventories and prices where prices decline
signiﬁcantly when an order is placed and consequently inventory reduction generates
price increase. The pricing behavior in this model can generate cross-sectional price
dispersion with cyclical patterns even without menu costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
shows important characteristics of ﬁrms’ expected sales. Section 3 characterizes the op-
timal decision rules. Section 4 concludes while the Appendix contains the proofs of the
results stated in the text.
2 The Model
Consider an oligopoly market where risk neutral ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ {1,2,...,N},
sell diﬀerentiated storable products. Each ﬁrm sells a variety of the product. Firms
compete in prices and they have uncertainty about temporary demand shocks. In the
short run, ﬁrms cannot respond to these temporary shocks neither by changing prices
nor by increasing supply, in case of excess demand. Firms do not face any delivery lags
and cannot backlog unﬁlled orders. Thus, whenever demand exceeds quantity on hand,
3the residual unﬁlled demand is lost. Therefore, the quantity sold by ﬁrm i at period t is
the minimum of supply and demand:
yit = min{sit + qit,dit}, (1)
where yit is the quantity sold; sit is the level of inventories at the beginning of period t;
qit represents new orders to wholesalers during period t; and dit is consumers’ demand.
Every period t a ﬁrm knows the levels of inventories of all the ﬁrms in the market, i.e.,
the vector st ≡ {s1t,s2t,...,sNt}.5 Given this information, the ﬁrm decides on prices and
new orders (pit,qit) to maximize its expected value Et(
 ∞
r=1 βrΠi,t+r), where β ∈ (0,1)
is the discount factor and Πit is the current proﬁt of ﬁrm i at period t.
A ﬁrm’s current proﬁt is equal to revenue minus ordering cost and inventory holding
cost:
Πit = pityit − ciqit − kiI{qit > 0} − hisit, (2)
where ci is the unit ordering cost; ki is the ﬁxed or lump-sum ordering cost; and hi is
the inventory holding cost.
The transition rule of inventories, i.e., state variables, is:
sit+1 = sit + qit − yit = max{0,sit + qit − dit}. (3)




Here, εit is a temporary and idiosyncratic demand shock that is independently and iden-
tically distributed over time with cumulative distribution function F(·) that is continu-
ously diﬀerentiable on the Lebesgue measure. These shocks are unknown to ﬁrms when
they decide prices and orders. Furthermore, de
it is the expected demand that depends on
the endogenous prices and the exogenous qualities of all products. The expected demand
de
it is a function of the prices of all ﬁrms such that it is strictly increasing in the own
price, strictly decreasing in the prices of competitors, and the revenue function pide
i is
strictly concave in pi. By deﬁnition of expected demand, we have that E(exp{εit}) = 1.
For technical reasons it is useful to assume that F(·) is such that the respective hazard
rate h(·) =
f( )
1−F( ) is smaller than one.6 For examples and numerical exercises it may be






j=1 exp{wj − αpjt}
, (4)
where {wi : i = 1,2,...,N} are exogenous parameters that represent product qualities,
and α is a parameter that represents the marginal utility of income. The logit demand
5This is a very reasonable assumption as ﬁrms can observe prices and are therefore able to learn and
deduce stock levels.
6This assumption is especially helpful for proving Lemma 2, although it is only a suﬃcient but not
necessary condition.
4model is convenient for the derivation and illustration of some future results, but it can
be relaxed for all our results.7
2.1 Implications of Demand Uncertainty for Expected Sales
As a ﬁrm does not know the temporary demand shock εit, it does not know actual sales
yit. Expected proﬁts are Πe
it = pit ye
it − ci qit − ki I{qit > 0} − hisit, where ye
it repre-
sents expected sales, i.e., ye
it = E[min{dit,sit +qit}]. Demand uncertainty has important
implications for the relationship between prices and inventories.
Lemma 1. Expected sales ye
it are equal to expected demand de

















The function λ(x) is deﬁned as
 
min{x,exp(ε)}dF(ε) and it has the following properties:
(i) It is continuously diﬀerentiable;
(ii) it is strictly increasing;
(iii) λ(0) = 0;
(iv) λ(∞) = E(exp(ε)) = 1; and
(v) for x > 0, λ′(x) =
  ln(x)
−∞ dF(ε) = 1 − F(ln(x)) ∈ (0,1).
Proof: See Appendix A.1.




out probability is very large such that expected sales are much lower than expected de-
mand (approaching zero). On the other hand, a high ratio (approaching inﬁnity) yields
low probability for stockouts such that expected sales are almost equal to expected de-
mand. The higher the supply-to-expected-demand-ratio the lower gets the probability
of stockout and the more do expected sales converge to expected demand. This is for-
malized in properties (ii) - (iv). From property (v) yielding λ′′(x) < 0 it is now clear
that the gain of a higher supply-to-expected-demand-ratio for expected sales is higher
the lower the ratio. For low ratios the gain is almost equal to the increase of stock as
one unit more in stock in essence is a unit more sold. For high ratios the probability of
selling an additional unit in stock decreases to zero.
Therefore, variability over time in the supply-to-expected-demand-ratio can generate
signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in expected sales and thus in optimal prices.
7See Aguirregabiria (2007) for a derivation of this demand model from a model of consumer behavior
under possible excess demand.
52.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
The model has a Markov structure and we assume that ﬁrms play Markov strategies.
That is, a ﬁrm’s strategy depends only on payoﬀ relevant state variables, which in this
model is the vector of inventories st. Therefore, a strategy for ﬁrm i is a function σi(st)
from the space of the vector of inventories, RN
+, into the space of the decision variables
(pit,qit), R2
+, i.e., σi(st) is a function from RN
+ into R2
+. Let σ ≡ {σi : i = 1,2,...,N} be a
set of strategy functions, one for each ﬁrm. Suppose that ﬁrm i considers the rest of the
ﬁrms to behave according to their respective strategies in σ. Under this condition, other
ﬁrms’ inventories, s−it, follow a Markov transition probability function Fσ
s−i(s−it+1|s−it).
Note that this transition probability function depends on the other ﬁrms’ strategies in
σ. Taking Fσ
s−i as given, ﬁrm i’s decision problem can be represented using the Bellman
equation:
V σ












The (expected) proﬁt function is continuously diﬀerentiable and the standard regularity
conditions apply such that the value function V σ
i is uniquely determined as the ﬁxed
point of a contraction mapping. Note that this value function is conditional to the other
ﬁrms’ strategies. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a set of equilibrium strategies
σ such that for every ﬁrm i and for every vector st ∈ RN
+ we have that












3 Optimal Decision Rule
Let us now characterize the optimal decision rule for a ﬁrm in this game of oligopolistic
competition.
In this section we will show that the (S,s) rule is indeed the best response not only
to an (S,s) rule but to any given strategy of the opponents. This, of course, implies that
the equilibrium resulting from (S,s) strategies by all players is a MPE.
In order to represent the optimal decision rule of the oligopolists, it is convenient to
represent the decision problem in terms of the variables pit and zit ≡ sit+qit. The variable
zit represents the total supply of the product during period t. It is also useful to deﬁne
the following ”value” function which is independent of the ﬁrm’s own current inventory,
i.e., the only state variable the ﬁrm can inﬂuence (however, it is not independent of the
6current state per se), and taking the other ﬁrms’ strategies in σ and so Fσ
s−i as given:
Qσ
















i (sit + qi,pi;s−it) − (hi − ci)sit − kiI{qi>0}
 
.
Given the function Qσ
i , it is clear that an oligopolist chooses (zit,pit) as a best
response to the other ﬁrms’ strategies in σ, i.e., other ﬁrms order and pricing decisions,
to maximize Qσ
i (zit,pit;s−it)−kI{zit > sit}. Making use of this ”value” function Qσ
i we
can derive important characteristics of competition in prices and inventories:
Lemma 2. The function Qσ
i is such that:
(i) Qσ
i is strictly concave in prices, i.e., ∂2Qσ
i (zi,pi)/∂pi∂pi < 0.
(ii) Prices and total supply are strategic substitutes, i.e., ∂2Qσ
i (zi,pi)/∂pi∂zi ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The positive stockout probability has a negative eﬀect on expected sales which in turn
creates substitutability between prices and inventories in the proﬁt function. This is the
case as with low inventory optimal expected demand (under given demand uncertainty)
is low and thus optimal price is high.
Using σσ
p(s) and σσ




ip(s)} = arg max
{zi≥si,pi≥0}
{Qσ
i (zi,pi;s−it) − kI{zi > si}}.
We deﬁne the optimal price as a function of current supply:
¯ pσ





i is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave in prices, ¯ pσ
i (z;s−i) is im-
plicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition
∂Qσ
i (zi,¯ pi;s−i)
∂¯ pi = 0.
It is now possible to show that the best response to any strategy is an (S,s) rule:
Proposition 1. Firm i considers the rest of the ﬁrms to behave according to their
respective strategies in σ. Taking Fσ
s−i as given, let ﬁrm i’s best response rule for total
supply and prices be σσ
iz(s) and σσ
ip(s), respectively. These functions are such that:
1. σσ
ip(s) = ¯ pσ
i (σiz(s);s−i), where ¯ pσ
i (zi;s−i) is continuous and strictly decreasing in
zi; and
72. σσ







i (s−i) if sit ≤ sσ
i (s−i)





i are scalars, with s∗σ
i > sσ
i ∀s−i, and the following deﬁnitions:
s∗σ
i (s−i) ≡ argmax
{zi}
Qσ
i (zi, ¯ pi(zi);s−i), (11)
sσ
i (s−i) ≡ inf{si|Qσ
i (s∗σ
i , ¯ pi(s∗σ
i );s−i) − k ≤ Qσ
i (si, ¯ p(si);s−i)}. (12)
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The proposition shows that consideration of oligopolistic competition does not aﬀect
the optimality of (S,s) inventory rules.8 Fixed ordering costs generate infrequent orders.
The upper band s∗σ
i is deﬁned as the optimal order quantity when the ﬁrm has no
inventory on hand, i.e., the optimal inventory level. The lower band sσ
i is the smallest
value of inventory such that the desired order quantity is zero. This order policy might
appear to be a very natural and intuitive strategy. However, as shown in the appendix
the value function is not concave such that a much more complex decision rule could in
principle be optimal. Additionally, oligopolistic competition assures that no additional
assumption on prices like the ”no expected loss condition” of Hall and Rust (2007) is
necessary for the optimal trading strategy to be of the (S,s) form.9
This (S,s) inventory behavior together with demand uncertainty generates cyclical
patterns in prices. The optimal price is a strictly decreasing function of a ﬁrm’s inventory
on hand zi as the positive probability of stockouts creates strategic substitutability
between prices and inventories. Thus, the price increases between two orders when the
stock level decreases and it drops down when new orders are placed. This is the case as
with low inventories the optimal expected demand is lower and hence the optimal price
is higher. When the level of inventories decreases between two orders, the probability of
stockout increases and so expected sales decrease and become more inelastic with respect
to the price. Thus, the optimal price increases between two orders, and decreases when
the elasticity of sales goes up as the result of positive orders.
The largest price increase occurs just after a positive order and the increments tend
to be smaller when we approach to the next positive order. The reason for this behavior
is that the cyclical path of prices generates a cyclical behavior in sales. The largest sales
and, consequently, the largest stock reductions and price increases, occur just after a
positive order.
8However, as thresholds depend on the competitors’ inventories, we have an (S(s−i),s(s−i)) decision
rule.
9The ”no expected loss condition” requires that the exogenous nonconstant retail price exceeds a
certain (endogenous) nonconstant threshold any time. With endogenous prices, we do not need to impose
such a condition.
8The interesting result here is that the pricing behavior in this model can generate
cross-sectional price dispersion with cyclical patterns even without menu cost. The mag-
nitude of this price dispersion will depend on the magnitude of lump-sum ordering costs,
the sensitivity of the price elasticity of sales to changes in the probability of stockout,
and the degree of correlation between the demand shocks at individual ﬁrms.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the best response not only to (S,s) strategies but to any strategy
is an (S,s) rule. This result extends earlier ﬁndings of models without price competition
(Hall & Rust, 2007) and models without strategic competition (Aguirregabiria, 1999)
where ﬁxed ordering costs generate infrequent orders. Thus, the (S,s) policy might
appear to be a very robust strategy. However, it is not hard to change assumptions in
ways that destroy its optimality.
Additionally, with strategic competition in prices (S,s) inventory behavior together
with demand uncertainty generates cyclical pattern in prices.
The model developed in this paper provides a very promising alternative for studying
commodity markets.
Commodity prices are extremely volatile and papers of the respective literature
strand are concerned whether theory is capable of explaining the actual behavior of
prices. The more recent literature on this topic (see for example Deaton & Laroque,
1992, 1996, and Pindyck, 1994) builds on the supply and demand tradition (see e.g.
Ghosh, Gilbert, & Hughes Hallett, 1987, for a review), but with explicit modeling of the
behavior of competitive speculators who hold inventories of commodities in the expec-
tation of making proﬁts.10 However, perfect competition and the absence of lump-sum
ordering cost is always assumed in these papers. The studies are trying to explain ex-
tremely volatile prices as a result of exogenous shocks by modeling the behavior of
competitive speculators holding inventories.
Results are rather unsatisfying: In contrast to the models’ predictions, real price
ﬂuctuations are not randomly distributed over time and this autocorrelation cannot be
explained by these types of models. In addition, some probably important characteristics
of commodity markets are not captured in this literature. Studies of these characteristics
(e.g. Carter & MacLaren, 1997, and Slade & Thille, 2006) ﬁnd that commodity markets
are best described by oligopoly instead of perfect competition. Besides, lump-sum order-
ing cost are realistic in some markets (e.g. at London Metal Exchange where orders can
result in physical delivery and all contracts assume delivery). Incorporating oligopoly
competition and lump sum ordering costs could be important to study the dynamics of
some commodity prices. In a model like ours we are able to generate some kind of time
dependent pattern which is apparently in line with empirical evidence. This is in contrast
10As even estimating the models is computational demanding authors mostly use simulations.
9to the usual hypothesis that price ﬂuctuations are the result of exogenous shocks and
therefore randomly distributed over time.
Making use of the developed model it should now be possible to relate ﬁndings
to commodity price dynamics and show that lump-sum ordering cost and oligopoly
competition can be important to explain extremely volatile prices and especially time
dependencies in price ﬂuctuations.
However, due to the relatively high complexity of the framework further research
requires numerical experiments. By this means, other topics like precise reactions of
ﬁrms on competitors’ orders provide scope for interesting studies. This important work
is left for future research.
10A Appendix
A.1 Expected Sales: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For notational simplicity, we omit here the ﬁrm and time subindexes. By deﬁni-
tion, expected sales ye are:
ye =
 





where λ(x) is deﬁned as
 



















I{x < exp(ε)}dF(ε) = 1 − F (lnx).
A.2 The ”Value” Function: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We use backwards induction and ﬁrst show that the properties of Lemma 2 hold
for the ﬁnite horizon problem with time horizon equal to T.
Let us consider Qσ
iT(·) to represent the proﬁt function in the last period, i.e.,
Qσ
iT(zi,pi;s−i) = −czi + piyeσ
i (zi,pi)











































































































































is just the second deriva-
tive of the function pideσ
i (pi), that is strictly concave by assumption. It is clear that the
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i (pi) < 0 as the elasticity of the λ(·)-function the above
















λ(·) is negative as λ′(·)+ zi
deσ
i (pi)λ′′(·) = 1−F(·)−f(·) is positive for 1−F(·) >
f(·) which is fulﬁlled by assumption. Thus, the second term of equation (15) is negative.




= yeσ(zi,pi)(1 − ηd(·)(1 − ηλ(·)))
12such that 1−ηd(·)(1 − ηλ(·)) can never be positive at the optimal decision and therefore
∂2Qσ
iT( )
∂pi∂zi < 0 holds.
We will now show that if Qσ
it+1(·) is strictly concave in prices and prices and supply
are strategic substitutes in t + 1, then Qσ
it(·) is strictly concave in prices and prices and
supply are strategic substitutes in t as well.














− cizi − kiI{zi>si}
 
is smaller than some constant τ < ∞. This property guarantees that for any values of
zi and pi
Qσ




Thus, as in t + 1 the ”value” function given as
Qσ






















is strictly concave in prices and prices and supply are strategic substitutes, so is the
function in t. This completes the proof.
A.3 Optimal Decision Rule: Proof of Proposition 1.
Following Scarf (1960), the key to proving that the optimal strategy is of the (S,s) form
is to show that the value function V is k-concave. Our proof exploits several properties
of k-concave functions.
A real-valued function f(s) is a k-concave function if and only if for every s0 and s1
such that s0 ≤ s1 and every scalar δ ∈ (0,1):
δf(s0) + (1 − δ)f(s1) ≤ (1 − δ)k + f(δs0 + (1 − δ)s1). (16)
Consider the following properties of k−concave functions:
(i) If f is strictly k-concave it has a unique global maximum.
(ii) If f is strictly k-concave, and s∗ is the global maximum, then the equation f(z) =
f(s∗)−k has two solutions, sL and sH with sL < sH. Furthermore, f(s) > f(s∗)−k
if and only if s ∈ (sL,sH).
(iii) If f(x,y) is k-concave in x for any value of y, and k-concave in y for any value of
x, and y∗(x) ≡ argmaxy f(x,y), then g(x) ≡ f(x,y∗(x)) is k-concave.
(iv) If f1(·) is k1-concave, f2(·) is k2-concave, and α1, α2 are two positive scalars, then
α1f1 + α2f2 is (α1k1 + α2k2)-concave.
13Before starting with the formal proof, we will brieﬂy illustrate the main idea of why
k-concavity is important.
Consider the k-concave function V (s) to be a ﬁrm’s value function. If V is a contin-
uous diﬀerentiable function from k-concavity V (s1) − k − V (s0) − (s1 − s0)V ′(s0) ≤ 0
directly follows. Thus for each local extremum s′ with V ′(s′) = 0, it is the case that
V (s′) ≥ V (s) − k ∀s ≥ s′. This means that each local extremum (minimum) s′ is at
most k units below a function’s maximum right of this local minimum. This property is
illustrated in Figure 1. The function on the left hand side is an arbitrary value function
that is not k-concave, while the function on the right graph fulﬁlls the condition above.
Order Order Order No Order No Order No Order
s 1 s 
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Figure 1: Non-concave value function and respective order decisions when the value
function is not k-concave (left) and when it is k-concave (right).
With lump-sum ordering cost of k and a ﬁrm’s value function like the one depicted
on the left hand side a complex optimal order policy results where the ﬁrm orders when
inventory is below s or around s′
1 such that inventory level s∗ is attained. Additionally,
the ﬁrm orders such that an even higher target level is reached when inventory is around
s′
2 (which is even above s∗).
With the value function being k-concave like the one depicted on the right hand side,
it is easy to see that the optimal strategy is of (S,s) type. In that case ﬁrms never order
with inventory above s∗ and ﬁrms never order around a local minimum in between the
inventory threshold s and the optimal inventory level s∗.
In the following we will make use of this idea with regard to the decision problem of
our model.
Proof. Suppose that Qσ
i is strictly k-concave in zi for any value of pi and strictly
k-concave in pi for any value of zi for all values of s−it.
The optimal price decision can be written as
σσ
ip(s) ≡ ¯ pσ
i (zi;s−i).
14That means, giving the optimal pricing function ¯ pσ
i (z;s−i) the ﬁrm chooses inventory
level σσ
iz(s) which results in pricing σσ
ip(s) as a function of the pre-order inventory.
As Qσ
i (·) is strictly k-concave, s∗σ
i (s−i) and ¯ pσ
i (s∗σ
i (s−i),s−i) are unique and ¯ pσ
i (·,·)
is a real function. Furthermore, Qσ
i (zi, ¯ pσ
i (zi);s−i) is also strictly k-concave.
By deﬁnition of σσ
iz(s), s∗σ
i (s−i), and ¯ pσ
i (s∗σ







i (s−i) if Qσ
i (s∗σ
i , ¯ pσ
i (s∗σ
i );·) − k > Qσ




i , ¯ pσ
i (s∗σ
i );·) − k ≤ Qσ
i (si, ¯ pσ
i (si);·).
Due to the k-concavity of Qσ
i (zi, ¯ pσ
i (zi);·) the equation Qσ
i (s∗σ
i , ¯ pσ
i (s∗σ
i );·) − k =
Qσ
i (si, ¯ pσ
i (si);·) has only two solutions.
Let these two solutions be sL
i (·) and sH
i (·), where sL
i (·) ≤ s∗σ





i , ¯ pσ
i (s∗σ
i );·) − k ≤ Qσ
i (si, ¯ pσ
i (si);·) ⇔ sL
i (·) ≤ si(·) ≤ sH
i (·).
It is clear that the conditions si > sH
i and si ≤ sH
i do not play any role because the
stock level is always lower or equal to s∗σ
i . With sσ
i as the smaller of the two solutions







i if si ≤ sσ
i ,
si if si > sσ
i .
The according optimal pricing decision for the inventory before ordering is
σσ





i ) if si ≤ sσ
i ,
¯ pσ(si) otherwise.
It further remains to show that Qσ
i is indeed k-concave.
We proceed in three steps:
(a) If V σ
i (s) is strictly k-concave in si, then Qσ
i (·) is strictly k-concave in zi for any value
of pi.
(b) If V σ
i (s) is strictly k-concave in si, then Qσ
i (·) is strictly k-concave in pi for any value
of zi.
(c) V σ
i (s) is strictly k-concave in si.
(a) We will now show that if V σ
i (s) is strictly k-concave in si, then Qσ
i (zi,pi;s−i) is
strictly k-concave in zi for any value of pi.
15By the ﬁrst part of the proof, there exist s∗σ
i and sσ




i can be represented as
V σ








i , ¯ pi(s∗σ
i );s−i) + csi − h(si) − k if si ∈ [0,sσ
i ),
Qσ
i (si,σp(si);s−i) + csi − h(si) if s ≥ s.
(17)
V σ








i (0,s−i) + csi if si ≤ 0,
V σ
i (s) else,
which is needed as the proof of (c) implies that Vi is k-concave in si over R.
We can write Qσ
i as
Qσ
i (·) = QσR




















i (max{0;zit − eεitdeσ
it (pit)};s−it+1)dF(εit)dFσ
s−i(s−it+1|s−it).
Let us now consider the function
 
V σ
i (si − eεideσ
i (·);·)dF(εi)dFσ
s−i. Since each V σ
i (·)
is k-concave in si over R, and since positive linear combinations of pointwise limits of
k-concave functions are k-concave, it follows that
 
V σ
i (si − eεideσ
i (·);·)dF(εi)dFσ
s−i is
k-concave in si on R. With ¯ εi(·) as the value of εi for which demand is equal to supply
zi, i.e. zi = exp(¯ εi(zi))deσ(·), we have
 
V σ




  ¯ εi(si)
−∞
V σ











  ¯ εi(si)
−∞
V σ
i (si − eεideσ
i (·);·)dF(εi)dFσ

















16Using the deﬁnition of Qσ
i , we have
Qσ
i (·) =QσR





i (pi)}dF(εi) − czi
+ β
  ¯ εi(zi)
−∞
V σ















The sum of the third and fourth terms in the last equation is k-concave since
 
V σ
i (si − eεideσ
i (·);·)dF(εi)dFσ
s−i is k-concave. Since czi is a linear and hence convex
function of zi, a suﬃcient condition for the k-concavity of Qσ













is concave in zi. The function is continuously diﬀerentiable in zi with second derivatives
(pi − βc)(1 − F(lnzi − lndeσ
i (·))).
As F(·) < 1, this expression is non-positive and hence Qσ
i is k-concave as long as pi ≥ βci.
(Obviously, a weaker condition for that result exists.)
For proving that Qσ
i is indeed k-concave we need to show that σσ
ip(s)−βc ≥ 0 holds.
Recall
Qσ



















i (sit + qi,pi;s−it) − (hi − ci)sit − kiI{qi>0}
 
.







are always smaller than or equal to total
supply zi. Let’s suppose to the contrary that there is an optimal price σσ
ip < βc < c.







would be negative. Thus, without a new order
the current value V σ
i (st) would be smaller than the expected value V σ
i (st+1) after selling
the goods at price σp(st) although the inventory is larger, i.e., sit > sit+1. This cannot
be the case in equilibrium. The same is true in the case with ordering. Ordering goods
and simultaneously selling them for a price lower than the purchase price cannot be an
optimal strategy. Thus, the optimal price σσ
ip is always greater c.
17(b) We will show that if V σ
i (s) is strictly k-concave in si, then Qσ
i (·) is strictly k-
concave in pi for any value of zi.
We can represent the function QσR
i (·) as −czi + piyσe(zi,pi;s−i), where yσe(·) is the
expected sales function. The function QσR
i (·) is the same as the function Qσ
i at the last
period Qσ







An argumentation analogous to part (a) yields a similar suﬃcient condition for the
k-concavity of Qσ













is concave in pi. The function is continuously diﬀerentiable in pi with a second derivative
that is negative. Therefore, Qσ
i (·) is k-concave in pi.
(c) Finally, we show that V σ
i (s) is strictly k-concave in si.
Like in proof of Lemma 2 we make use of the fact that the proﬁt function is bounded
from above. This property guarantees that for any value of si
V σ





iT(si) as the value function for the ﬁnite horizon problem with time horizon equal
to T. We prove k-concavity by induction.
For T = 1 we have Qσ
i1(·) is strictly concave in zi and pi due to (a) and (b). Using the
result of the ﬁrst part of the proof, the optimal decision for this one-period problem has
the form of equations (9) and (10). Hence, the value function of this one period problem
is
V σ
i1(si,·) = I(si < sσ
i1)(Qσ
i1(s∗σ
i1 , ¯ pσ
i1(s∗σ
i1 )) − k) +I(si ≥ sσ
i1)Qσ
i1(si, ¯ pσ
i1(si,·)) − (hi − ci)si.
With Qσ
i1(·) being concave, it is simple to verify that V σ
i1(si,·) fulﬁlls the deﬁnition of
strict k-concavity.
Assume now that for any t ≥ 1, V σ
it(si,·) is strictly k-concave. Then,
Qσ
it+1(zi, ¯ pσ



































− czi is again strictly concave and V σ
it(si,·) is
strictly k-concave, due to property (iv) of k-concave functions, Qσ
it+1(zi, ¯ pσ
it+1(·);·) is also
strictly k-concave. Hence, the optimal decision has again the form of equations (9) and
(10) and the value function of this ﬁnite-horizon problem is
V σ









+ I(si ≥ sσ
it+1)Qσ
it+1(si, ¯ pσ
it+1(si,·)) − (hi − ci)si.
18Similar to V σ
i1(si,·), this value function is strictly k-concave which completes the proof
by induction. Therefore, V σ
i (si;·) = limT→∞ V σ
iT(si;·) is strictly k-concave.
This completes the proof of the optimality of the described ordering strategy.
Properties of the optimal price. We complete the proof of Proposition 1 by showing
that ¯ p(·) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function.
The function ¯ pσ
i is the value of pi that maximizes Qσ
i in pi for a given zi. Since Qσ
i is
continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave in prices, ¯ pσ
i (z;s−i) is implicitly deﬁned
by the ﬁrst order condition
∂Qσ
i (zi,¯ p;s−i)







i (zi,¯ pi)/∂pi∂pi, that by Lemma 2 is negative.
This completes the proof.
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